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Note
The Joinder of Claims to a Third-Party Impleader
Without Independent Jurisdictional Ground-
Herein Also of the Camel and His Pendent Fleas
INTRODUCTION
Since 1965,' the federal district courts, especially those in Pennsyl-
vania,' have had difficulty reaching uniform decisions on third-party
practice, the joinder of claims, and the distinctions between "ancillary"
and "pendent" jurisdiction. This problem reached a climax in 1971
when the Third Circuit in Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R. R.! held that
a defendant who properly impleads third-party defendants under rule
14 of the federal rules of civil procedure may include a separate claim
against the impleaded party even though the claim is without independent
jurisdictional basis.' This note will outline the conflicting judgments of
the federal district courts in Pennsylvania, examine Schwab in the light
of established interpretations of the federal rules, and expose the
inherent problems of the appellate court's decision.
I. A SURVEY OF THE PLOT
Schwab, a Pennsylvania resident' and employee of Erie Lackawanna
R. R., was injured when the train he was riding collided with a truck at
a private railroad crossing. He brought an action against Erie, a Penn-
sylvania corporation, under the Federal Employers' Liability Acte and
against the owner of the railroad crossing for negligence.! The defendants
impleaded the owner of the truck, the estate of the driver of the truck,
' The federal rules of civil procedure discussed in this topic note were materially
amended in 1966. It is these amendments which have caused the difficulties examined
herein.
'While all the cases discussed herein originate in Pennsylvania, the problems inherent
in these rules are common to all circuits. See note 127 infra.
3Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R. R., 438 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1971).
4 Id.
5 Complaint of Plaintiff Schwab, at 1; Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R. R., 303 F.
Supp. 1398 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
645 U.S.C. § 51 (1964). See also Complaint of Plaintiff Schwab, supra note 5, at 1;
438 F.2d at 64.
7 Complaint of Plaintiff Schwab, supra note 5, at 3; 438 F.2d at 64.
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 14 as amended Feb. 1966: "At any time after the commencement
of the action a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and
complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable
to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." See also Third-Party Com-
plaint of Defendants, supra note 5, 5 7; 438 F.2d at 64.
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and the company from which the truck was leased.! These third-party
defendants were all Pennsylvania residents."' The plaintiff's motion to
amend his complaint to assert a direct claim against the third-party
defendants was denied because of lack of diversity."
In its third-party complaint, Erie asserted a separate "counterclaim"'2
of less than $10,000 against the impleaded third-party defendants for
damages to the train. The third-party defendants moved to dismiss the
separate claim alledging (a) lack of diversity, (b) lack of a sufficient
amount in controversy, and (c) absence of a federal question.1" The
district court ruled the third-party defendants were not opposing parties
against whom a counterclaim could be lodged." The judge labeled the
separate claim "pendent"" and, in his discretion, dismissed it.'" The
separate claim was further described as one which "offends .. . the
mandate of Fed. R. Civ. P. 82"" by attempting to extend the jurisdiction
of the court. The court stated: "Once the camel got his nose under the
tent, we would have to make room for the entire animal including its
pendent fleas."" From this ruling, Erie appealled to the Third Circuit
which held a defendant who properly impleads third parties on the
ground they "are or may be liable to him for all or part of the [original]
plaintiff's claim against him"'" may also include a separate claim against
the impleaded party, based upon the same transaction, even though the
claim is without independent jurisdictional basis. Since Erie's claim was
not a counterclaim or a cross claim"' within the scope of rule 13,1 it was
'438 F.2d at 64. See Third-Party Complaint of Defendants, supra note 5, 2.
"0Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim of Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, Erie
Lackawanna R. R., supra note 5, at 1. While the appellate court mentions there is no
diversity between the third-party plaintiff, Erie, and the third-party defendants, this fact
becomes apparent only in the pleadings.
"1 303 F. Supp. 1398. The court further stated there is a requirement of "independent
jurisdictional grounds for the assertion of a claim by plaintiff against a third-party de-
fendant .... Had plaintiff wished to assert a direct claim against all parties, he could
have done so in the state court, where no such jurisdictional barriers exist." Id. at 1399.
It is curious that the Schwab appellate court never discussed the plaintiff's motion of
joinder. Nor does the court explain how the third-party separate claim could be ancillary
to a claim which is jurisdictionally void.
12438 F.2d at 64. See Third-Party Complaint of Erie Lackawanna, supra note 5, at
2, 5 8. For a discussion of this "counterclaim," see Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R.,
48 F.R.D. 444 (1970) and 438 F.2d 65-66.
"438 F.2d at 64. See Amended Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, supra
note 5.
14 48 F.R.D. at 444.




" See note 8 supra.
20 438 F.2d at 64-66.
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
1971] NOTE
categorized as a separate non-compulsory claim. Since the third-party
defendants were properly impleaded under rule 14,"2 they were "parties"
to the action and Erie could use rule 18" to assert any claims it had
against any "opposing party.""4 Jurisdiction was viewed as either (a)
ancillary to the original cause of action, or (b) ancillary to the im-
pleaded action which was itself ancillary to the main cause of action."5
II. PRE-SCHWAB DECISIONS
Rule 18 was materially amended in 1966,' to settle substantial prob-
lems concerning third-party practice and the joinder of claims." The
"old rule"" contained ambiguous wording which led some courts to
examine motions for the joinder of claims as if each claim were an
individual request for relief subject to the rules pertaining to party
joinder and jurisdiction. The 1966 amendment was designed to eliminate
this vagueness and to bring certainty into the area of joinder of claims.
Yet, despite the new rule and despite the notes of the Advisory Com-
mittee, federal district courts continued to render contradictory opinions.
As the following Pennsylvania cases illustrate, when the original com-
plaint in Schwab was filed, confusion reigned supreme in third party
practice.
Case 1, Western District, Prior to the 1966 Amendment: In Gebhardt
v. Edgar,"' A sued B for damages arising from an automobile accident
in Pennsylvania. Diversity jurisdiction existed because a foreign admin-
istrator was appointed for the injured party, as allowed in Pennsylvania
federal courts at that time. B impleaded C, a Pennsylvania resident,
under rule 14 and asserted a separate claim against him. The court per-
See note 8 supra.
's FED. R. Civ. P. 18, as amended Feb. 1966: "(a) A party asserting a claim to relief
as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as
independent or alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as he has
against an opposing party."
24 The appellate court in Schwab was careful to point out that through the use of
rule 14 the third-party defendants had become "opposing parties." 438 F.2d at 66. In
this way the requirements of rule 18 were satisfied; however, since the third-party de-
fendants lodged no claims against Erie, there was no "opposing party's claim" to satisfy
rule 13.
2 438 F.2d at 70.
28 For the amended rule 18, see note 23 supra.
27 For a discussion of the pre-1966 amended rule and the problems developed, see
3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 18.01 [1]-[3] (2d ed. 1970) [hereinfater cited as
MOORE]. See also Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 7,
14-16 (1967). When reading the Cohn article, notice the similarity between it and the
appellate court decision in Schwab even to the point of citing the same cases.
28 FED. R. Civ. P. 18 (prior to the 1966 amendment) reads in part: "There may be
a like joinder of claims when there are multiple parties if the requirements of rules 19
[necessary joinder of parties], 20 [permissive joinder of parties], and 22 [interpleader]
are satisfied." See MOORE, § 18.01.
29 Gebhardt v. Edgar, 251 F. Supp. 678 (W.D. Pa. 1966), Judge Weber presiding.
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mitted the impleaded claim to remain because it was "ancillary"'" to the
plaintiff's original complaint, but B's separate claim against C was dis-
missed. The court allowed the impleader because of "the language of
rule 14 which permits third-party claims for contribution or indemnity
without regard to diversity."'" The separate claim was subject, however,
to "the limits of diversity imposed under rule 82. . .. ""
Case 2, Eastern District, 1966: In Newman v. Freeman,"3 A, a New
Jersey resident and guardian for the injured minor plaintiff, sued B, a
resident of Pennsylvania, for injuries occurring in an automobile acci-
dent. A amended his complaint to allow a claim for relief by the minor's
father, also a Pennsylvania resident. The father's claim was classified as
"pendent""4 because it developed from "a common nucleus of operative
30 An understanding of the distinction between "pendent" and "ancillary" becomes
critical to an appreciation of these conflicting pre-Schwab cases and to an appreciation
of certain aspects of the Schwab decision. For pendent jurisdiction, there must be two
claims; one claim is a federal issue and the second is a state claim. These two claims
must "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" and be such that a plaintiff
"would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding." United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS, § 20, at 64 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]. In contrast,
ancillary jurisdiction confers jurisdiction upon a court to hear an entire controversy,
even if certain claims fall below normal jurisdictional standards. 1 BARRON & HOLT-
ZOFF, FEDERAL PROCEDURE 23 (Wright ed. 1964); WRIGHT § 9. As a condition to being
ancillary, the claim in question must be in "direct relation to property or assets actually
or constructively drawn into the court's possession or control by the principle suit."
Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 274, 276 (1925); WRIGHT § 9, at 20. For addi-
tional explanation as to the type of actions traditionally classified as ancillary, see
WRIGHT, § 9, at 21 and the appropriate references. Note that the practical distinction
between ancillary and pendent is that with a pendent claim, the court has discretionary
power to dismiss or retain the claim. WRIGHT § 20. One of the major difficulties with
Schwab is that the court never fully explains how the separate claim of Erie is ancillary
when the claim fits all the conditions and definition of pendency. An immediate reaction
is, that by classifying the claim as ancillary, the court may "assume" jurisdiction so as
to leave open only the question of joinder. Additionally, pendent jurisdiction "refers
only to the joinder of state and federal claims, though this concept is not unrelated to
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction applicable in diversity litigation. The pendent juris-
diction concept applies only where the same parties are involved on the state and federal
claims. It does not permit bringing an additional party to respond to a state claim on
the ground that that claim is closely related to the federal claim against an existing
party." Wojtas v. Village of Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964); WRIGHT § 20, at 65.
Compare this statement with the appellate court in Schwab: "Because the claim arises
out of the same set of facts as the claim for liability-over [an FELA claim], . . .we find
compelling the analogy to a compulsory counterclaim [which is ancillary] ... [t]o be
sure, a district court has a certain discretion in deciding how to dispose of multiple
claims in a single action. But that discretion is not unlimited and cannot be enlarged
by simply characterizing a claim as 'pendent' ...... 438 F.2d at 71.
31 251 F. Supp. at 681. The court also stated concerning third-party jurisdiction over
rule 14 impleaders: "No diversity of citizenship is required here ... under Fed. R. Civ.
P. Rule 14(a) does not require diversity of citizenship between the defendant, third-
party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant because such proceedings are regarded as
'ancillary'." Id. at 679.
321d. at 681.
33 Newman v. Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
" See note 30 supra.
facts [and was joined with] a federal claim that ... [was] properly within
our power."' The court allowed the claim to be asserted.
Case 3, Eastern District, 1967: The facts in McSparren v. Weist' are
essentially the same as those in case 2, above. The district court, however,
granted the defendant's motion for dismissal of the parent's claim and
commented: "[I]f the joinder of right referred to [by the plaintiff] is
sustained on appeal, this court will face a staggering increase in 'arti-
ficial' jurisdiction. Injured parents, as well as the children, would be
permitted to try their personal injury claims against their next door
neighbor by use of this artifice ... in dismissing this action, the writer
hopes there will be an immediate appeal so that this question may be
settled on its legal merits . . . ."" While the Third Circuit sustained this
ruling, there was no judgment as to the use of rule 18 and the question
as to the joinder of additional claims.
Case 4, Western District, 1967: The facts in Obney v. Schmalzreid"
are the same as is case 2, above. The district court permitted the separate
claim to remain "although no diversity existed between the plaintiff
parents and the defendant."'" In conclusion, the court commented: "If
this overburdens the Federal Courts with actions which are essentially
local, the remedy is either an enlargement of the Federal Court system
or statutory limitation on diversity cases." '
Case 5, Middle District, 1968: With facts the same as those in case 2,
above, the court in Meyerhoffer v. Hanover Township School District"'
dismissed the parent's claim and stated: "This court would not have
jurisdiction over the father's claim since he and the defendants are all
residents of Pennsylvania. '
Case 6, Eastern District, 1968: In Oliveri v. Adams," again the facts
are the same as in case 2, above. The additional claim by the parents
was dismissed because the separate claim was not pendent." In con-
clusion, the three-judge court stated: "In view of the crowded condition
of this court's docket, we are not favorably disposed to encourage an
-262 F. Supp. at 107.
36 McSparran v. Weist, 270 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Pa. 1967), 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1968).
3i Id. at 422.
31 Obney v. Schmalzreid, 273 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967), Judge Weber presiding.
39 Id. at 374.
40 Id. Compare the "spirit" of this statement by Judge Weber with his statement
quoted in Situation I and note 18 supra.
41 Meyerhoffer v. Hanover Township School District, 280 F. Supp. 81 (M.D. Pa.
1968).
4Id. at 85.
4Oliveri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
4Id. at 433.
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increase here of state law claims on "artificial" diversity grounds. .. .'
We have no desire to open potential floodgates of additional state claim
litigation in this court.""'
Case 7, Eastern District, 1968: In Weber v. Weber," A sued B for
damages arising from a Pennsylvania accident. B impleaded C under
rule 14. C filed a claim against B for personal injuries. The third-party
defendant's claim against the third-party plaintiff was held to be an
independent cause of action involving "many of the same factual issues""
as the original plaintiff's cause of action; therefore, the claim was an
"offshot of the same basic controversy between the parties"'" such that
it was a "compulsory counterclaim" within Fed. R. Civ. P. 13. Thus,
the jurisdiction was ancillary to that of the original cause of action.
If rule 18 was amended in 1966 to bring certainty into the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and eliminate substantive investigations re-
garding "necessary" or "compulsory" parties," no such certainty existed
at the time Schwab was filed. Given the same fact situation, one court
would classify the joinder issue as "pendent," while another court
labelled the issue "ancillary." In dicta, judges urged parties to seek im-
mediate appellate review of the joinder issues; however, the only ap-
pellate review which materialized dealt with the appointment of a
foreign guardian to achieve diversity. Fears were voiced that use of rule
18 would lead to increased litigation between residents of the same state
in federal court. A full circle was completed by one judge. First, he dis-
missed, for want of jurisdiction, any claim that was not compulsory.
Subsequently, he urged an enlargement of the federal court system to
permit claims between residents of the same state if joined with a
"genuine" federal diversity action. Finally, this same judge reverted to
his original position, dismissing claims, which he labelled "pendent."
While the preceding cases are not all third-party actions, they are illus-
trative of the foregoing circumlocution and present many of the diverse
opinions present when Schwab was filed. Indeed, in addition to the
obvious confusion which dominated the district courts at that time, one
wonders why the district courts refused to adhere to the appellate
4 The "artificial" jurisdiction referred to by the court is partly a reference to the
practice in Pennsylvania of appointing foreign guardians to represent injured minors so
as to obtain federal jurisdiction. See generally Daniels, Use of Assignments and Ap-
pointments to Create or Destroy Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 1 LOYOLLA U.LJ. (Chi-
cago) 111 (1970); Note, 1 ST. MARY'S L.J. 125 (1969). A further aspect of "artificial"jurisdiction will be discussed subsequently.
46 280 F. Supp. at 433.
4 7 Weber v. Weber, 44 F.R.D. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
4
1 Id. at 230.
49 Id.
10 See note 27 supra.
decision in McSparren and why the district courts continued to foster a
petty provincial squabble over joinder claims for relief.
III. THE SCHWAB SOLUTION
The appellate court in Schwab presents a novel solution to what the
court considers to be the singular issue of the joinder of a separate claim
for relief to a third-party indemnification action. The court rejected any
thought that, acting independently, rules 13,"' 14,"2 or 1 8 will permit
the joinder in question. "[This] does not end our inquiry. Both as a
matter of policy and logic, Erie should be permitted to assert its separate
claim .... What remains for us to determine is whether there exists a
procedural approach . . . for asserting the claim.""4
Working backwards,' the court rationalized that the demand for
relief within the separate claim is one that normally would be within
rule 18. "The rule assumes, of course, the existence of jurisdiction over
the claim . . . ."' Thus, the court centered the decision on the question
of joinder rather than upon the question of jurisdiction, and commented
only that "we are also convinced that the concept of ancillary jurisdiction
is broad enough to encompass this claim.""7 By "ancillary" the court
stated that the separate claim may be viewed as "ancillary to the main
claim or ancillary to the third-party claim which is itself ancillary to
the original claim against the railroad."58 To arrive at the conclusion that
rule 18 encompasses the separate claim by Erie, the court determined
that use of rule 14 makes the third-party defendants "parties" to the
action. 9 Once the third-party defendants are "parties," rule 18(a) pro-
vides that "a party asserting a claim to relief as... [a] third-party claim,
may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims
. . . as he has against an opposing party. . . ."" Under these circum-
stances, we conclude that Rule 14 must be read in conjunction with
Rule 18(a), as amended, and read together, these two rules give the




5- The customary practice when a claim is placed before a federal court is to deter-
mine whether jurisdiction exists; however, in Schwab jurisdiction was assumed (with
respect to rule 18) (438 F.2d 68-69) and the primary focus was upon the question of
joinder.
58 438 F.2d at 68-69.
57 Id. at 69; see note 30 supra.
51438 F.2d at 70.
19 "Rule 14(a) now, of course, limits the impleaded party to one who is or may be
liable to (the original defendant) for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him,'
and, in so doing, establishes third-party litigants as opposing parties." 438 F.2d at 66.
8438 F.2d at 68, citing FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
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third-party plaintiff a proper procedural route for asserting his affirm-
ative claim for damages."'" The court continued admitting: "[We] realize
that we are furrowing new ground,""2 but "it is difficult to perceive any
prejudice to the plaintiff." 3
The usual rules governing the joinder of parties are rule 19" (joinder
of parties needed for just adjudication) and rule 20" (permissive joinder
of parties). Rule 14" operates, however, as an exception to the general
and customary rules of party joinder."' That is, rule 14 is used solely to
eliminate a separate indemnification action by the original defendant
against third parties. As the Advisory Committee stated: "[The purpose
of rule 14 is] to avoid two actions which should be tried together to save
time and cost of reduplication of evidence, to obtain consistant results
from identical or similar evidence, and to do away with the serious
handicap to a defendant of a time difference between a judgment against
him and a judgment in his favor against the third-party."88 Rule 14 is
not to be interpreted, however, as "a device for bringing into an action
any controversy which may happen to have some relationship to it.''9
Thus, because rule 14 is a permissive rule" specially designed to eliminate
a duplication of litigation, the jurisdiction of a claim for indemnification
is ancillary to the main cause of action,' assuming the claim is truly one
for indemnification "arising from one set of facts in one action . . .,,,
This does not mean that rule 14 can be used to expand the jurisdiction
of the court or to allow separate claims.' As the appellate court cor-
rectly stated in Schwab: "Rule 14 limits third-party complaints to actions
over for part or all of the plaintiff's claim. It does not allow for other
damages." Therefore, concerning Erie's separate claim: "[A] defendant
cannot assert an entirely separate claim against a third party under rule
14, even though it arises out of the same general set of facts as the
main claim ...
81 Id. at 70.
62id. at 71.
3 Id. at 69.
6FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
03 FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
" Supra note 8.
'WRIGHT, § 76.
88 MOORE, 5 14.04 at 71; see also WRIGHT, at 333.
'9 MOORE, 5 18.01.
78 MOORE, § 14.06; WRIGHT, at 333.
71 MOORE, § 14.26; WRIGHT, at 334.
72 1A BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 422 (Wright ed., 1960); WRIGHT
at 333.
"'MOORE, § 14.03; WRIGHT at 334.
74438 F.2d at 68. Subsequently, the court stated: "[W]e too must reject the view
that Rule 14 permits recovery of damages in excess of, or different from, that sought by
the original plaintiff in his main claim." Id.
"MOORE, § 14.07, at 512, cited in Schwab, 438 F.2d at 68.
If the third-party defendants had been joined, under rules 19 or 20
and the requirements of jurisdiction had been properly satisfied, then
rule 18 could have been freely used to assert any other claims between
parties. If, however, the third-party defendants are "parties" solely by
virtue of rule 14 (as was the case in Schwab), the joinder of claims is
restricted until independent jurisdictional ground is established."6 Hence,
it has been noted that "full utilization of this type of impleader may not
be possible. . . ."" Neither can rule 18 be envisioned as permitting the
joinder of "parties." "The joinder of parties is governed by other rules
acting independently. . . . [Almended rule 18 (a), like the rule prior to
its amendment, does not purport to deal with questions of jurisdiction or
venue which may arise with respect to claims properly joined as a matter
of impleading."' 8 Therefore, despite any reference to previously joined
"parties" in rule 18 (a) the rule becomes operative only after parties are
properly joined and after jurisdiction has been established." The natural
limitations "are those imposed by principles relating to federal jurisdic-
tion and venue.""0 Additional limitations upon the operation of rule 18
are imposed if the "party" is a "party" solely pursuant to rule 14. That
is, a claim may be properly before the court as a matter of pleading, but
other rules may render the additional claim void. Professor Wright com-
ments that despite the use of rule 14, "questions of federal jurisdiction
may still limit this kind of joinder"'" so that rule 18 will not allow the
assertion of separate claims."
Assuming for the moment that the third-party defendants were prop-
erly before the court as "parties" to the action, the critical question of
jurisdiction remains. Rule 14 confers jurisdiction solely upon the action
for indemnification." Rule 18 cannot be used to confer jurisdiction upon
any claim as "amended rule 18 (a), like the rule prior to its amendment,
does not purport to deal with questions of jurisdiction or venue which
may arise with respect to claims properly joined as a matter of plead-
ing."" Indeed, rule 18 is even subordinate to the rules concerning the
" Supra notes 74, 75.
77 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE USDC: PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS 18 (1964).
'
8 MooRE, § 18.01, at 1814.
71 MOORE, S 18.04; WRIGHT, at 76.
1°MooRE, 5 18.04.
"WRIOrT, at 334; Wright, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Procedure, 42
F.R.D. 552, 559-61 (1962).
2WRIGHT, at 334; see also MOORE, § 18.07. It is interesting to note that the court's
citation of Wright (438 F.2d 69) stops just short of the .critical language which specifies
the satisfaction of the federal jurisdictional requirement before rule 18 can be used with
rule 14 to allow separate claims.
"' MOORE, § 14.26; WRIGHT, at 334. See also supra notes 74, 75.
"Supra note 78.
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joinder of parties: "The joinder of parties is governed by other rules
acting independently."
85
There is an intralocking relationship of the federal rules wherein rules
act both independently and, yet, connect to form a network of procedural
standards. This relationship may not be sidestepped by saying "the
drafters of the Federal Rules were not simply acting as a collective
Linneas of the Law."" It follows that separate claims between parties,
other than those of the original plaintiff and defendant, are limited by
those principles "relating to federal jurisdiction and venue."8
Erie attempted to avoid these problems by denominating its separate
claim a "counterclaim."" The court correctly held otherwise, ruling that
since the third-party defendants had lodged no complaint against Erie,
the requirements for rule 13 had not been satisfied." The court stated
that the federal rules, as drafted, would not permit the separate claim
to remain; however, policy prevails over established interpretations of
the rules to allow the action to continue.
In order to appreciate the court's decision, a brief recapitulation is
necessary. Plaintiff sued Erie under the FELA and a co-defendant under
common law negligence. These defendants impleaded the third-party de-
fendant under rule 14. The original plaintiff attempted to amend his
pleading to allow a claim for relief against the third-party defendant.
This amendment was not allowed for want of diversity. Erie, by virtue
of the Third Circuit decision, was permitted to assert a separate claim
against the third-party defendant. If the separate claim ' is viewed as
ancillary to the original plaintiff's claim against Erie, an FELA action,
then the jurisdictional ground for the separate claim will fail. "[Jiuris-
diction over a claim against a defendant by virtue of a federal matter
will not support jurisdiction over a separate" nonfederal claim."1 If the
separate claim is viewed as ancillary to the impleaded action by Erie,
then the jurisdictional ground will also fail since "rule 14 limits third-
party complaints to actions over for part or all of the plaintiff's claim.
It does not allow for other damages." 2 If the separate claim had been
lodged by Erie's codefendant, then the jurisdictional ground would fail
for want of a sufficient amount in controversy. Thus, the original plain-
tiff could not have lodged a claim against the third-party defendant."
Id. (emphasis added).
" 438 F.2d at 64.
87 Supra note 80.
88438 F.2d at 64.
89 438 F.2d at 64-65. See note 24 supra.
oa 438 F.2d at 64.
MOORE, S 20.07; WRIGHT, at 62-65.
8 Supra note 75.
9 3Supra note 11.
The separate claim cannot be ancillary to the rule 14 impleader;"' nor
could the separate claim be ancillary to the original FELA action against
Erie." Yet, the court insists: "[W]e are also convinced that the concept
of ancillary jurisdiction is broad enough to encompass this claim . . .
[with the separate claim] ancillary to the main claim or ancillary to the
third-party claim which is itself ancillary to the original claim against
the railroad."' 6
The court appeared first to determine that the joinder of the separate
claim is permissable and, then, to attach a jurisdictional label which
eliminated an investigation into the nature of the claims." In so doing,
the natural restraints of the federal rules were overlooked: "This gen-
eral, conditional rule of federal jurisdiction, often seriously restricts the
successful joinder of plaintiff and defendant."'"
IV. POST SCHWAB PROBLEMS
In light of the confusion which existed prior to Schwab, and in light
of the vast authority which contradicts elements of the Schwab opinion,
an analysis of these elements is in order to appreciate the full impact
of Schwab with respect to the areas of "artificial" jurisdiction and res
judicata.
A. Artificial Jurisdiction.
Some federal district judges in Pennsylvania have questioned any
expansion of rule 18 because of the danger of "a staggering increase in
'artificial' jurisdiction"" which would permit persons to "try their per-
sonal injury litigation against [their] next door neighbor in federal
court."10' Others have warned that expanded use of rule 18 will "encour-
age an increase ... in state law claims on 'artificial' diversity grounds.""'
Consider this hypothetical situation:
A of Texas designs an aircraft braking system but is unable to
obtain a patent due to obviousness. A shows the system to B Co.
of Texas hoping B Co. will manufacture the system and pay
royalties based upon sales. B Co. executes a contract and begins
manufacture but pays A nothing. A has a friend C, of Oklahoma,
file an action in federal court in Texas falsely alleging that A
breached a contract to supply the system. A impleads B Co. under
"See notes 92, 74 and 73 supra.
9" Supra note 91.
"See notes 57, 58 supra. See also note 30 supra.
11 See note 27 supra.
9 MOORE, § 19.04 [2].
" Supra note 37.
100 ld.
" Supra note 46.
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rule 14 and on the basis of Schwab asserts a separate non-federal
claim against B Co. for breach of contract."°2 C and A fraudulently
settle, leaving A's claim against B in federal court without diversity
jurisdiction.
Such "absurd" events do occur. For example, in Black & White Taxicab
v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab"' wherein the plaintiff reincorporated in an
adjoining state to establish diversity and, thereby, avoid state court
decisions which might have been harmful to its "monopolistic" desires. '
Arguably, the Erie-Guaranty Trust approach" to federal procedure seeks
to eliminate "forum shopping;" '' however, Schwab appears to encourage
the juggling of claims to obtain federal jurisdiction.
B. Res Judicata.
Aside from getting into court, the second impact of Schwab lies in the
area of res judicata. The traditional rule in the federal system is that
failure to implead through rule 14 or failure to join a noncompulsory
claim will not operate as a bar to a subsequent action."' Thus, in
Schwab, had the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision and
prohibited Erie's separate claim, it would have been brought in a sub-
sequent state action. Pennsylvania, like some other states, ' is careful,
however, to insist that plaintiffs avoid a duplication of litigation. As
established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in London v. City,10" ' a
claim which could have been presented in a prior federal court action
will be barred as violative of the principles of res judicata should subse-
quent action be maintained in a Pennsylvania state court. In London,"'
A was involved in an automobile accident which resulted in injury to B
and C. They sued the owner of the other vehicle, D. He impleaded A
under rule 14. D recovered $10,000 contribution from A. During the
pendency of the action, A maintained an action in state court against
D. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the action was barred.
The claim asserted by A was one within the scope of rule 13 and, hence,
must be pleaded in the prior federal court litigation. The supreme court
was careful, however, to indicate that despite the compulsory nature of
"'For two cases with similar fact situations, see Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex.
566, 314 S.W.2d 763 (1958); K & G Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Tool Serv., 158 Tex.
594, 314 S.W.2d 782 (1958).
103 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
4 WRIGHT, at 74, n.12.
"5 WRIGHT, 5 55; 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PROCEDURE §5 8, 138 (Wright
ed. 1960).
16 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965); WRIGHT, at 228.
1 MooRE, §§ 14.06, 18.04; WRIGHT, at 347-49, 343.
108 WRIGHT, at 347.
"0" London v. City of Philadelphia, 412 Pa. 496, 294 A.2d 901 (1963).
110 Id.
London's claim,11' failure to assert any claim which can be construed as
ancillary to the original cause of action will operate as res judicata in
subsequent state action." The appellate court decision in Schwab has,
therefore, placed Pennsylvania state judges in an awkward position. The
state judges must now make value judgments whether in a prior federal
action a claim might have been considered ancillary. If so, London will
impose res judicata. This position is contrary however, to the federal
rules which do not impart an element of "compulsoriness" upon all
ancillary claims."' That is, had the court in Schwab refused to permit
the separate claim, then only compulsory rule 13 claims would trigger
res judicata-as is currently the principle in federal practice." However,
by allowing the separate claim, Schwab opens Pandora's box for sub-
jective inquiries as to how federal courts might have ruled on prior
nonexistent pleadings."' Consider the following illustrative situation:
A, the owner of a small airport repair shop in Maine, purchases a
lathe from B Co. of Pennsylvania. C, a resident of Texas, is visiting
the plant while his plane is being repaired, when a guard rail on the
lathe breaks causing physical injury. C sues A in federal court in
Maine. A impleads B Co. under rule 14. [Under Schwab, A could,
also, maintain a separate action for damage to the plant from the
accident.] C recovers and B Co. is ordered to indemnify A. Sub-
sequently, A sues B Co. in Pennsylvania state court for property
damage under Restatement of Torts § 402A. C, citing Schwab and
London, successfully interposes res judicata to avoid the litigation.
In Texas, however, the same situation would produce a different result.'
Therefore, Schwab creates two further areas of concern. First, Schwab
leads to forum shopping to avoid (or to take advantage of) the applica-
tion of the Schwab-London principle of res judicata. Second, in states
such as Pennsylvania which adhere to London type evaluations of prior
litigation, Schwab transforms what are normally permissive pleading
practices11 into compulsory pleading requirements.
A PROGNOSIS
As an unappealed judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Schwab stands as "good law" in Pensylvania and will be cited as
I Id. at 902.
112 Id.
"' See note 107 supra.
"I WRiGtr, § 79.
"' Judge Weber, the trial court judge in Schwab, Obney and Gebhardt, had previ-
ously recognized the danger of London, see 251 F. Supp. at 781. This may have been
another reason for his reluctance to term Erie's claims ancilliary.
"' See generally 34 TEX. JuR. 2d "JUDGMENTS," at § 372 (1968).
" See note 107 supra.
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"authorative law" in other circuits. Yet, with the discrepancies which
exist between the decision and other authorities, with the radical trans-
formation of certain aspects of permissive party pleading into com-
pulsory party pleading, and with the novel sidestepping of federal juris-
diction, this writer "hope[d] there [would have been] an immediate appeal
so that this question may be settled on its legal merits" ' rather than
upon "policy..... Yet, it is virtually impossible for an attorney to receive
funds from a client to maintain a certiorari action on a purely pro-
cedural matter in which the amount in controversy is less than $6000.
Indeed, in Schwab there has not even been a trial on the merits,
In a broader view, however, it is evident that Schwab is contrary to
the trend toward a restriction of diversity actions.' ° If anything, the
court's mandate that rules 14 and 18 automatically confer jurisdiction
upon the claims of opposing parties residing in the same state will ex-
pand and encourage "artificial" diversity actions. In this way, Schwab
served to "open the potential floodgates of additional state claim litiga-
tion"" in federal courts.
The Schwab decision would be much more palatable had there been
no available alternatives; however, slight modifications in perspective
present interesting results. The court could have simply affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the separate claim. In this event, neither the
Schwab-London problem nor the FELA difficulty would arise. On the
other hand, the court could have classified the separate claim as ancil-
liary. There is authority for this approach."' Third, the court could have
classified the separate claim a crossclaim within rule 13(g)'" in which
case "independent jurisdictional grounds are not required and there can
be no venue objections.""
Instead, the court places itself, federal courts in general, and Pennsyl-
"' See note 37 supra.
"I Supra note 54.
120 Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute Pro-
posals, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185 (1969); Marden, Reshaping Diversity Jurisdiction:
A Plea For Study by the Bar, 54 A.B.A.J. 453 (1968). As an example of the decrease
in diversity actions, Wright states that in 1968, 21,609 diversity actions were maintained
while under the A.L.I. proposals that number would be cut to 10,000. Wright, id., at
194.
2 Supra note 46.
'See United States v. Heywood-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1970);
Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970);
Noland Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 301 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1962) (the court specifi-
cally rejected Noland, 438 F.2d at 68); WRIGHT, at 62-65; Comment, 59 Ky. L.J. 506
(1970-71); Note, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1303 (1970); Note, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 511
(1970).
"3FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g). The court had classified the third-party defendant as an
opposing party by virtue of the rule 14 impleader (438 F.2d at 66); hence, if the claim
were labelled a "cross-claim" jurisdiction would be ancillary. Yet, the London problem
would not arise because rule 13(g) is not compulsory. See generally WRIGHT, § 80.
" WRIGHT, § 80,
vania courts in particular, in an awkward position. The court's interpre-
tation of the federal rules ignores the trend toward a limitation on
diversity jurisdiction, encourages forum shopping and artificial jurisdic-
tion," ' and creates a holding that will probably be either ignored" or
overturned upon the first opportunity.'7 Despite the "policy" argument,
Schwab raises serious questions concerning the dominant authority of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and civil practice in the federal
courts.
Van P. Carter
' See note 120 supra.
" See note 54 supra.
121 See Benazet v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 442 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1971). A, a
railroad employee, sued B for injuries resulting in the course of his employment. B
impleaded Erie in language fitting under rule 14. The claims were both dismissed.
The court so ruled without a discussion of Schwab and, of course, Erie was silent as
to the Schwab holding.
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